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This paper uses extensive student-level micro databases of three international student 
achievement tests to estimate heterogeneity in the effect of external exit exams on student 
performance along three dimensions. First, quantile regressions show that the effect tends to 
increase with student ability. But it does not differ substantially for most measured family-
background characteristics. Second, central exams have complementary effects to school 
autonomy. Third, the effect of central exit exams increases during the course of secondary 
education, and regular standardised examination exerts additional positive effects. Thus, there 
is substantial heterogeneity in the central exam effect along student, school and time 
dimensions. 
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1. Introduction 
More and more evidence is accumulating that the existence of central exit exams is strongly 
positively related to students’ academic performance (cf. Bishop, 2004, for a survey). Cross-
country studies have shown that students performed better in countries with curriculum-based 
external exit exams on the 1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) 
math, science and geography tests, the 1991 International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA) Reading Literacy study, the 1995 Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the 1999 TIMSS-Repeat study and the 2000 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) reading, math and science tests. 
Likewise, cross-regional studies in countries where some regions have external exit exams 
and others not have shown the same result for Canadian provinces, US states and German 
states.1 Most of these studies implicitly assume a homogeneous effect of central exams and 
stress their general impact on the behaviour of students (cf. Bishop, 2004; Hanushek, 2002).  
Instead, this paper argues that central exams exert heterogeneous performance effects, 
depending on students’ backgrounds, on schools’ specific settings and on time patterns, 
because they change the behaviour of students, parents, teachers and schools in varying ways. 
For example, the effect of central exams may differ depending on student ability, parental 
background, the degree of school autonomy and the grade in which they are implemented.  
The paper tests the hypothesis of effect heterogeneity using extensive micro data at the 
student level from the three largest and most recent international student achievement tests, 
namely TIMSS (conducted in 1995), TIMSS-Repeat (1999) and PISA (2000). Since in nearly 
all countries, the existence of central exit exams is a national characteristic, the effect of 
central exams can be estimated best using such international data. Furthermore, in order to 
detect effect heterogeneity, micro data containing extensive information on student and 
school background characteristics is necessary. This makes the international micro databases 
uniquely capable to provide evidence on the heterogeneity of the effects of central exams.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical background of why 
the effect of central exams may be heterogeneous along different dimensions. Section 3 
briefly describes the databases, as well as the basic empirical specification. Section 4 presents 
empirical evidence on effect heterogeneity of central exams along the student dimension, 
                                                 
1  The specific references for the different studies are: IAEP: Bishop (1995, 1997); IEA Reading: Bishop 
(1999); TIMSS: Bishop (1997), Wößmann (2003a); TIMSS-Repeat: Wößmann (2003b); PISA: Bishop (2004), 
Fuchs and Wößmann (2004); Canadian provinces: Bishop (1995, 1997, 1999); US states: Bishop (1995), Bishop 
et al. (2000, 2001); German Länder: Jürges et al. (2003).   2
including both student ability and family background. Section 5 tests effect heterogeneity 
along the school dimension, focussing on differential effects by school autonomy. Section 6 
presents evidence on effect heterogeneity along the time dimension, considering both whether 
the effect of central exit exams differs through the course of secondary education and whether 
more regular standardised testing throughout secondary education renders additional effects. 
Section 7 concludes with a summary of the main findings.  
2. Theoretical  Background 
It is the impact of information on incentives and behaviour that forms the theoretical 
background of this paper. Simple extensions of the basic model of central-exam effects (e.g., 
Bishop and Wößmann, 2004), adding additional plausible assumptions and additional actors 
such as parents, teachers and schools, give rise to predictions that the effect of central exams 
on student performance may be heterogeneous along the student, school and time dimensions.  
2.1  Heterogeneity by Student Characteristics 
2.1.1 Labour-Market Signalling and Heterogeneity by Ability 
There may be several reasons why central exams may affect students of different ability levels 
differently. For example, central exams may exert non-linear effects because of curricular 
thresholds, as in minimum competency exams or in exams with particularly high curricular 
standards. In such curriculum-based arguments, the existence and direction of effect 
heterogeneity depend on the particular curricular design.  
This paper focuses on incentive-based models that consider the signalling value of 
different kinds of exams on the labour market. Under plausible assumptions, such models 
predict that central exams may have stronger effects on high-ability students than on low-
ability students. Consider the classical model of why central exams may affect student 
learning (e.g., Bishop, 1995, 2004; Bishop and Wößmann, 2004). This model suggests that 
grades on centralised exams provide a better signal than locally-graded exams of what 
students have learnt to employers and to institutions of higher education. Thus, students’ 
rewards for learning are higher where central exams are in place. Due to these increased 
incentives to learn, student performance will be higher in central-exam systems than in 
systems without central exams.  
Now, let us supplement this basic model by the following two assumptions. First, local 
employers can assess the signalling value of local grades better than employers from other   3
regions. That is, locally-graded exams to some extent carry a local signal, but not an inter-
regionally assessable signal. Second, low-ability students are less mobile than high-ability 
students. Low-ability students tend to look for jobs on the local labour market, while high-
ability students have a stronger propensity to migrate to other areas to find better job matches.  
Given the combination of these two additional assumptions, the model will predict an 
effect heterogeneity of central exams by student ability. For low-ability students, the positive 
incentive effect of central exams is relatively small, because locally-graded exams also carry 
some signal for them. Thus, the additional positive incentive effect of central exams as an 
inter-regionally assessable signal will be relatively small for them. For high-ability students, 
by contrast, the locally-graded exams do not have a signal in other regions where many of 
them will migrate to. Therefore, the incentive effect of central exams is relatively stronger for 
high-ability students than for low-ability students.  
Thus, the model predicts that the effect of central exams increases with students’ ability. 
However, given that there may be other reasons for an effect heterogeneity by ability, e.g., 
depending on the specific curricular implementation of the central exams, the issue ultimately 
remains an empirical question, which will be addressed in Section 4.  
2.1.2 Incentives and Parental Behaviour 
The incentives created by the signal of central exams will not only affect the behaviour of 
students and employers, but also of parents. As the parental behaviour resulting from the 
availability of the signal may be expected to differ for parents of different background and 
interest, the model can straightforwardly be extended to effect heterogeneity of central exams 
by family background and parental interest.  
Where central exams are in place, parents have information on the performance of their 
children against an established standard and relative to other students in the education system. 
Therefore, given central exams, parents can not only assess their children’s performance 
against an absolute standard, but they also have some knowledge to decide on who might be 
responsible for this performance. For example, parents will generally know the performance 
of some other students in their children’s class and the average performance in the country. 
Thus, in contrast to a system of teacher grading, parents now know whether it is mainly their 
own child who is doing badly or whether it is the whole class which is performing badly. That 
is, with central exams, they are in a better position to monitor the performance of students, 
teachers and schools. Consequently, parents are able to put pressure on students and/or   4
teachers – whomever they deem responsible for the poor performance of their children.2 
When teachers grade their students themselves and students get marks relative to their class 
mean only, parents are not able to observe the performance of the class relative to the country 
mean and thus have no information on which to base a potential intervention. The existence 
of the information disseminated to parents by central exams is thus likely to affect the 
behaviour of both students and teachers in a way that furthers students’ academic 
performance.  
In the same way, parents can now monitor the performance of the whole school relative to 
other schools, and of the administrative entity relative to others. Given that central exams thus 
impact student performance through the channel of altered parental behaviour, the impact of 
central exams on student achievement may differ both for different educational and social 
backgrounds of the students’ parents and – related to but apart from that – for parents 
showing different degrees of interest in their children’s achievement.  
First, similar to the curriculum-based arguments raised above, it is not clear ex ante 
whether students from different family backgrounds would be affected differently by central 
exams. On the one hand, better-educated parents may be better equipped and motivated to use 
the additional information provided by central exams, so that the impact of central exams may 
be bigger for students from better family backgrounds. On the other hand, central exams may 
focus teachers’ and schools’ attention particularly on the performance of students from poorer 
family backgrounds who do not face strong learning incentives at home. Given central exams, 
teachers and schools can be additionally rewarded for achieving better performance among 
these students. Both kinds of effects could also net out, so that there would not be effect 
heterogeneity of central exams with respect to observed family background.  
Second, while central exams provide information to all parents, not necessarily all parents 
will be willing and able to make use of it. Thus, the impact of central exams might differ 
depending on how strongly parents care for their children’s progress. In central-exam 
systems, parents who show interest in how much their children learn have a meaningful 
foundation to intervene and will probably use this opportunity to pressure students and 
teachers to increase their effort. But parents who are less concerned with their children’s 
                                                 
2  In a pure sense, this statement is correct only for central exams before the end of schooling, i.e. for non-exit 
exams, whereas central exit exams provide information only after individual children have left school. However, 
parents can use the information provided by central exit exams for other students in upper grades in their 
children’s school to get informed about the relative performance of their school and of specific teachers, which 
will in turn allow them to pressure for better performance in their own children’s teaching. 
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educational performance may not make use of the additional information. Involvement of 
interested parents in the teaching process may thus be more beneficial in a central-exam 
system, while this channel may not work with parents who are less interested. Thus, the effect 
of central exams may be expected to be stronger where parents are strongly interested in their 
children’s progress. 
2.2  Heterogeneity by School Characteristics 
2.2.1 A Principal-Agent Approach to Educational Production 
The complexity of the model of incentive effects of information can be increased further by 
introducing schools into the model. Rather than being mere technical executors, actors in 
schools exhibit behaviour based on their own interests, which gives rise to agency problems 
in educational production. Once we allow schools to differ in their characteristics, particularly 
with respect to the degree of autonomy of schools and teachers, the model predicts interaction 
effects between central exams and school autonomy, so that the two work as complements.3  
The provision of education can be understood as a network of principal-agent relationships 
in which a principal (e.g. the parents) commissions an agent (e.g. a school director) to 
perform a service (the education of the children) on behalf of the principal. If such a 
principal-agent relationship features both asymmetric decentralised information and a 
constellation of opposing interests between principal and agent, the agency may lead to 
inefficient provision (cf. Laffont and Martimort, 2002). For if the agent’s interests diverge 
from those of the principal, and if the principal is not fully informed about the agent’s real 
performance, then the agent may pursue his own interests instead of those of the principal, 
without the latter becoming aware of this behaviour and thus without him being able to 
sanction it.  
Central exams can contribute to mitigating the problem of incomplete monitoring of the 
actions of the agents in the education system by supplying information about the performance 
of individual students relative to the national (or regional) student population. They 
harmonise the incentives of the agents more strongly with the interests of the principal and 
thus with the objectives of the education system (cf. Wößmann, 2002). They make the 
performance status of the students visible and comparable for parents, teachers, potential 
employers and advanced educational institutions, so that better performance can be rewarded 
(cf. Bishop and Wößmann, 2004). They also prevent that entire areas of knowledge can be 
                                                 
3  This section builds on Wößmann (2003c).   6
omitted in individual classes without any consequences for marking, and they reveal to 
parents and school directors whether the teachers are effective in passing knowledge on to 
their students.  
2.2.2 School Autonomy With and Without Monitoring 
School autonomy or the decentralisation of decision-making power in various decision-
making areas can be understood as such delegation of a task by a principal to agents. In 
decision-making areas where both divergent interests and asymmetric information are given, 
incentives and possibilities exist for the agents to act in an opportunistic way without 
incurring the risk that such behaviour will be noticed and sanctioned.  
The danger of opportunism by decentralised decision-makers is thus limited to those 
decision-making areas in which their interests diverge from the objective of enhancing 
students’ knowledge. This is, for instance, imaginable whenever the decision concerns the 
financial position or the workload to be fulfilled by the schools. In such cases, it is rational for 
the school decision-makers to favour their own interests over the promotion of student 
performance as long as monitoring agencies such as school governors or parents have no 
information about the actual behaviour of the schools. In view of the decentralised character 
of educational provision, there is almost always a high degree of information asymmetry 
about school behaviour. Nevertheless, it can be at least partially overcome by central exams, 
which supply information about actual performance.  
An additional crucial point to be noted is that in many decision-making areas, local 
decision-makers know much better than a central agency ever could how education services 
can be most efficiently provided. Thus teachers usually have a local knowledge lead as 
regards the best way of teaching their specific students a specific subject. This local 
knowledge lead can make provision by a local agent more efficient than by a central planning 
authority. But the decisive factor is whether these decision-makers also have the incentive to 
exploit their local knowledge lead in providing educational services. This will be the case 
only when others become aware of whether they have made the effort to utilise their local 
knowledge – i.e., only when information asymmetries are bridged, for instance by central 
exams.  
Figure 1 represents the ensuing effects on performance by school autonomy for various 
decision-making areas which may be characterised by the presence or absence of incentives 
for opportunistic behaviour and of local knowledge leads. In those areas where no incentives 
for opportunistic behaviour exist because the interests of agent and principal do not diverge,   7
the effects of school autonomy on performance can be easily determined. If local decision-
makers have a knowledge lead in such areas, school autonomy has a positive effect on 
educational performance. This is because the advantages of local decision-making (local 
knowledge lead) exist, while the disadvantages (opportunistic behaviour) do not. If local 
decision-makers have no knowledge lead in these areas, there will be no difference between 
decentralised and centralised decision-making. In both cases, the effects are not 
heterogeneous with respect to central exams, because by definition there is no risk of 
opportunistic behaviour which would have to be averted.  
< Figure 1 about here > 
Central exams change the effect of school autonomy on performance only in decision-
making areas that offer incentives for opportunistic behaviour due to the diverging interests of 
agent and principal. In areas without a local knowledge lead and consequently with no 
benefits of decentralised decision-making, school autonomy has a negative impact on student 
performance without central exams due to local opportunistic behaviour. But with central 
exams, the risks of negative performance effects due to local opportunistic behaviour are 
averted, so that performance will not differ between autonomous and central decision-making.  
In decisions containing both incentives for opportunistic behaviour and benefits of superior 
local knowledge, central exams can avert the disadvantages of opportunistic behaviour, so 
that the local knowledge lead produces an overall positive effect of school autonomy on 
performance. Without central exams, the advantage of superior local knowledge must be 
weighed against the disadvantage of opportunistic behaviour, and the net effect of school 
autonomy depends on the relative size of these two partial effects. So it is not obvious 
whether these decision-making areas yield a slightly positive effect, no effect or an overall 
negative effect of school autonomy. The negative net effect depicted in Figure 1 is based on 
the empirical results reported in Section 5 below, where the negative opportunism effect tends 
to outweigh the positive knowledge effect. In this case, central exams turn an originally 
negative effect of school autonomy on performance completely around to become a positive -
effect.  
2.3  Heterogeneity by Time 
Two simple ideas that extend the model even further give rise to a final dimension of effect 
heterogeneity, namely the time dimension. The first time aspect considered is whether the 
effect of central school-leaving exams differs with the grade that students are currently  






























Notes: “Incentives for opportunistic behaviour” and “local knowledge lead” are features of the respective 
decision-making area which can be organised either autonomously or non-autonomously.  
+: Autonomy enhances student performance. –: Autonomy reduces student performance. 0: No performance 
difference between autonomous and central decision-making.  
Source: Wößmann (2003c).    8
attending. The second aspect is whether regular standardised testing during secondary 
education exerts additional effects on top of the effects of central school-leaving exams.  
According to the classical model of central-exam effects (cf. Section 2.1.1), central exit 
exams increase students’ incentives to learn because they increase the future external rewards 
for learning on the labour market. As potential employers and institutions of higher education 
have central exit exams at their disposal to assess applicants’ educational performance, they 
can base their hiring decisions more on observed educational performance. Therefore, the 
impact that central exit exams at the end of secondary school exert on student learning may be 
expected to grow over the course of secondary schooling. The closer students are to the 
finishing grade, the more important the central-exam effect may get. Thus, there may be a 
first effect heterogeneity of central exams along the time dimension, in that the effect of 
central school-leaving exams increases with grade levels.  
A second way in which external exams may show heterogeneity along the time dimension 
is that not only central exit exams, but also more regular central exams during the prior course 
of schooling may yield positive incentive effects. Regular standardised exams in various 
grades improve the information status in the education system even in a system that already 
has central exit exams. Thanks to their earlier availability, in the case of unsatisfactory 
performance they also allow countermeasures to be taken far ahead of the end of secondary 
education. Therefore, one might expect regular standardised testing in earlier grades to have 
positive effects in additional to central exit exams. 
3. Data and Empirical Model 
3.1  The International Databases 
In order to test the different hypotheses derived in the previous section empirically, I use data 
from three international comparative tests of student performance. The Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) was initially carried out in 1995 (“TIMSS-95”) and 
was repeated in 1999 (“TIMSS-Repeat“). TIMSS-95 has internationally comparable data for 
266,545 students from 6,107 schools in 39 countries, and TIMSS-Repeat covers 180,544 
students from 6,068 schools in 38 countries. The pooled TIMSS database thus contains a total 
of 447,089 student and 77 country observations. As only 23 countries took part in both tests, 
the pooled database contains 54 different countries. Both TIMS studies were carried out by 
the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). In the 
middle-school years, TIMSS-95 tested the two grades with the largest proportion of thirteen-  9
year-old students, which in most countries correspond to seventh and eighth grades. TIMSS-
Repeat tested only the upper of these two grades. Beaton et al. (1996), Gonzalez and Smith 
(1997) and Martin and Kelly (1996, 1997) provide detailed information on the TIMSS-95 
database (see also http://timss.bc.edu). For more information on the TIMSS-Repeat database, 
see Mullis et al. (2000), Martin et al. (2000) and Gonzalez and Miles (2001). 
The third international student achievement test used in this study is the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), carried out by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) for fifteen-year-old students in 2000. This dataset covers 
175,227 students in reading (96,855 in math, 96,758 in science) in 32 countries. Adams and 
Wu (2002) and OECD (2000, 2001, 2002) provide detailed information on the PISA study 
(see also http://www.pisa.oecd.org). All three studies sampled a representative random 
sample of schools in each country.4  
This article uses the individual student data of the three databases, so that as many 
different education systems with and without central exams as possible can be considered, as 
well as local differences in student and school characteristics within these systems. In 
addition to the performance data on math, science and reading of the individual students, the 
databases contain extensive background information obtained via various questionnaires. 
Thus, data from student questionnaires allow to control extensively for the influences of the 
personal and family background of the students in both TIMSS and PISA. In TIMSS, teacher 
questionnaires contain data on both teacher characteristics and class resources as well as on 
the influence of teachers in various decision-making areas. Finally, questionnaires of school 
directors in particular provide information about the degree of school autonomy in various 
decision-making areas of the TIMSS and PISA schools.  
In addition to the data from the student achievement tests, the databases used here contain 
information about whether central exit exams are held at the end of secondary school in the 
countries concerned (or in regions within these countries). All forms of “curriculum-based 
external exit exam systems” (Bishop, 1997) are considered, but not university entrance exams 
which are not taken by all students and thus do not represent an integral part of the education 
system. The information about central exams is taken from comparative educational studies, 
educational encyclopaedias, interviews with representatives of the various national education 
systems, government documents and background documentation. In cases where central 
                                                 
4  Wößmann (2003a, 2002) and Fuchs and Wößmann (2004) contain more detailed information and notes on 
the specific databases used in this paper.   10
exams are taken in only some regions of a country, the data used specifies the proportion of 
students who take them. Unfortunately, internationally comparable data on central exit exams 
in reading is not available, so that the measure used in this paper is a simple mean of the 
existence of central exit exams in math and science. Therefore, the results in reading may 
strongly suffer from attenuation bias due to measurement error.  
3.2  The Basic Empirical Specification 
To estimate the effect α of central exams E on student performance T, the student-level 
estimations have the following form of an international education production function: 
(1)  Tilsc = α Ec + Bilsc β + Rlsc γ + Ilsc δ + a + µc + ηs + υl + εi   , 
where Tilsc is the test score of student i in class l in school s in country c. Ec is the proportion 
of students in country c who take part in central exams.5 The estimation controls for a host of 
other variables, including a constant a, vectors of variables for the student’s personal and 
family background B , variables for school resources and teacher characteristics R and 
variables for several institutional features I such as the extent of school autonomy in various 
decision-making areas and the centralisation of curricula and textbooks.6  
The main identifying assumption of this empirical specification is that conditional on all 
the family, school and institutional background variables, there are no other cross-country 
features that are consistently related to both central exams and student performance. Then, the 
least-squares coefficient on central exams will reflect the effect of central exams on student 
performance. Previous research suggests that the central-exam effect estimated using such an 
international least-squares specification does not seem to be significantly biased by 
endogeneity or omitted-variable biases, with neither other institutional differences, nor the 
general degree of a country’s centralisation, nor the homogeneity of a country’s population, 
nor cultural differences driving the estimated effects (Wößmann, 2003b). By using data from 
three international student achievement tests with different samples of participating countries, 
this paper can also test for the sensitivity of results to the countries included in each test.  
Owing to the complex data structure produced by the survey design of the international 
tests and the multi-level nature of the explanatory variables, the error term of the regression 
                                                 
5  As these involve national central-exam systems in most cases, E is usually assigned the dummy values 0 or 
1.  
6  The specific control variables included for each test differ slightly because of differing availability of 
background data. For an enumeration of the individual control variables contained in the TIMSS regressions see 
Wößmann (2002), and in the PISA regressions Fuchs and Wößmann (2004).   11
has a non-trivial structure. It features components at various levels: µ is a country-specific, η 
a school-specific, υ a class-specific and ε a student-specific component. The error 
components are implemented by clustering-robust linear regression (CRLR). The CRLR 
method relaxes the classical assumption of independence across individual observations and 
requires only that the observations be independent across primary sampling units (PSUs). 
This is implemented by using a block-diagonal disturbance variance-covariance matrix with 
one block for each PSU consisting of the actual disturbance covariance structure of the least-
squares disturbances in the PSU (for details, cf. Moulton, 1986; Deaton, 1997, pp. 74-78). By 
allowing any degree of dependence within PSUs, CRLR lets the data determine the structure 
of error components in equation (1) to estimate appropriate standard errors in multi-level 
analyses. That is, in estimating the effect of family and school characteristics, CRLR 
considers any existing interdependence of the error terms for students within individual 
schools (and within whole countries when estimating the effect of central exams, which do 
not vary within countries).  
Finally, both TIMSS and PISA used a stratified sampling design within each country, 
producing varying sampling probabilities. To obtain nationally representative estimates from 
the stratified survey data, the regressions use weighted least squares (WLS) estimations that 
weight each student by her sampling probability within countries. This ensures that the 
proportional contribution to the parameter estimates of each stratum is the same as would 
have been obtained in a complete census enumeration (DuMouchel and Duncan, 1983; 
Wooldridge, 2001). Between countries, the weights give equal weight to each country.  
4.  Evidence on Heterogeneity by Student Characteristics 
The following three sections provide empirical evidence on each of the three dimensions of 
effect heterogeneity of central exams discussed in Section 2. This section analyses how the 
effect of central exams differs for students with different characteristics (cf. Section 2.1). 
First, it estimates the effect heterogeneity of central exams on student performance by 
students’ underlying ability level. Second, it estimates interaction effects between central 
exams on the one hand and family background and parental interest on the other hand.    12
4.1  Heterogeneity by Student Ability 
4.1.1 Quantile  Regressions 
In order to test whether the effect of central exams on student performance differs by 
students’ ability levels, I estimate equation (1) using quantile regressions (cf. Koenker and 
Bassett, 1978). The basic learning ability of students – e.g., their innate ability or their 
learning motivation – remains unmeasured, virtually by definition. However, once all the 
family-background, resource and institutional effects are controlled for, the conditional 
performance distribution should be strongly correlated with ability (or, more precisely, with 
that part of ability that is not correlated with the control variables).  
In the following empirical application, this conditional performance distribution is termed 
“ability.” Quantile regressions estimate the effect of central exams on student performance for 
students at different points on this ability distribution.7  
4.1.2  Results on the Effect Heterogeneity of Central Exams by Student Ability 
The results concerning the effects of central exams on student performance estimated both by 
standard least-squares estimations and by quantile regressions are depicted in Figure 2 for the 
different international datasets. The horizontal lines of Figure 2 show the least-squares 
coefficients on central exams, estimated using equation (1). On each test, students in countries 
that have external exit exam systems perform better than students in countries that do not 
have external exit exam systems. In each case, this effect is statistically significantly different 
from zero at conventional significance levels.8  
< Figure 2 about here > 
The size of the estimated effects is very large. Both the TIMSS and the PISA test scores 
are scaled so that each discipline has an international mean of 500 and an international 
standard deviation of 100 among the participating countries in the respective test. Since the 
participating countries are different in the different studies, the quantitative results are not 
directly comparable. In TIMSS-95, the mean difference between seventh and eighth grade in 
the international sample is roughly 40 test-score points. Thus, the difference in the 
performance of students in countries with and without central exams is roughly as large as 
                                                 
7  Previous education production function studies using quantile regressions are Eide and Showalter (1998) and 
Levin (2001) for resource effects and Fertig (2003) and Wößmann (2004) for family-background effects. 
8  While confidence intervals are not shown in the figure for expositional reasons, the standard errors, 
estimated by clustering-robust techniques using countries as level of clustering, are as follows: TIMSS-95: math 
13.5, science 9.9; TIMSS-Repeat: math 13.5, science 12.9; PISA: math 10.2, science 8.2.  
  
Figure 2: Effect Heterogeneity by Student Ability: Quantile Regressions 
Coefficient on external exit exams. – Horizontal lines: WLS estimates. –  














































































































Notes: Control variables in the regressions include [number of variables]: TIMSS-95: student and family background [17], 
resources [14], institutions [18]. TIMSS-Repeat: student and family background [15], resources [14], institutions [18]. PISA: 
student and family background [40], resources [8], institutions [13].   13
one grade-level equivalent in the TIMSS studies, i.e. the knowledge learnt in an entire school 
year. The smaller numerical values estimated for the PISA study are nearly exclusively due to 
the different scaling according to the different participants in PISA. Once using a rescaled 
scale that should be more comparable by looking only at countries participating in both 
studies, the estimated effects in PISA are nearly as large as in the TIMSS studies.  
The curved lines with dots in Figure 2 report quantile-regression coefficients of the same 
model for 19 quantiles ranging from 0.05 to 0.95.9 For three of the six considered tests, the 
effect pattern of central exams on student performance increases with ability: TIMSS-95 
math, TIMSS-95 science and PISA math. On these tests, there is effect heterogeneity of 
central exams by student ability, as predicted in Section 2.1.1. On the PISA science test, the 
pattern is relatively flat in the lower half (initially slightly decreasing), but it also shows an 
increasing patter in the upper half. On the TIMSS-Repeat math test, the pattern is flat, while 
on the TIMSS-Repeat science test, the pattern is slightly shaped like an inverted U.10  
As indicated before, no decent central-exam information is available in reading, so that the 
effect is not depicted in Figure 2. However, Fuchs and Wößmann (2004) use a simple mean of 
the central-exam variable in math and science for the reading regressions and find a positive 
but relatively small and statistically insignificant effect of 6.9 test-score points. Using the 
same variable to estimate quantile regressions, I find a pattern of central-exam effects steadily 
increasing with ability also for PISA reading.  
4.2  Heterogeneity by Family Background and Parental Interest 
4.2.1 The Interaction Specification 
While the above quantile regressions allowed to detect effect heterogeneity along an 
unobserved dimension, the interest is now in effect heterogeneity along the observed 
dimension of measures of family background and parental interest. Such kind of 
heterogeneity can be estimated by adding interaction effects between central exams and the 
observed family-background characteristics, including measures of parental interest, to 
equation (1) above:  
(2)  Tilsc = α Ec + (Ec Bilsc) λ + Bilsc β + Rlsc γ + Ilsc δ + a + µc + ηs + υl + εi   . 
                                                 
9  The statistical precision of the quantile-regression coefficients is slightly lower than that of the least-squares 
estimates. 
10  One reason for the different pattern in TIMSS-Repeat might be the different set of participating countries.    14
The estimated interaction effects show whether the effect of central exams on student 
performance differs for students from different family backgrounds.11  
4.2.2 Family Background 
Table 1 reports the estimated effects of family background and its interaction with central 
exams in TIMSS, where the TIMSS-95 and TIMSS-Repeat studies are pooled together. Table 
2 reports equivalent results in PISA. The columns labelled “Coefficient” report the coefficient 
estimate β on the family-background variable itself, and the columns labelled “Interaction” 
report the coefficient estimate λ on the interaction term between the family-background 
variable and central exams of the same regression.  
< Tables 1 and 2 about here > 
Family background generally exerts strong effects on students’ educational performance 
both in TIMSS and in PISA. In both studies and in all subjects, family-background 
characteristics such as immigration status, family status, parental education and the number of 
books at home (serving as a proxy for the educational, social and economic background of the 
family) are strongly positively related to students’ educational achievement. In PISA, there is 
additional information on parents’ occupation and work status, which are also significantly 
related to student achievement.  
More importantly for the topic of this paper, there seems to be some, but not much, 
difference in the family-background effects between systems with and without central exams. 
In TIMSS, the first heterogeneity is that central exams dampen the effect of the country of 
birth of students and their parents. That is, immigrants seem to gain more from central-exam 
systems than nationally born students. Second, the performance advantage of students living 
with both parents is larger in central-exam systems. Third, central exams also decrease the 
effect of parental education. Under a system of central exams, it seems to matter less from 
which parental background students come. Fourth, there is not much evidence that central 
exams affect students from homes with different amounts of books differently in math. But in 
science, the positive effect of having more books at home is larger in central-exam systems. 
This finding counters the effect for parental education, which goes in the opposite direction.  
In PISA, there is much less evidence of effect heterogeneity of central exams by family 
background. First, not a single one of the “books at home” dummies shows a statistically 
                                                 
11  In addition to the family background, resource and institutional controls, the PISA regressions also control 
for a set of imputation controls (cf. Fuchs and Wößmann, 2004). 
  
Table 1: Interaction Effects between Central Exams and Family Background in TIMSS 
 Math  Science 
 Coefficient    Interaction  Coefficient   Interaction 
Family background   
          
     
   
Student born in country  20.3 
* (2.1)   -4.2  (2.9)  28.1 
*  (2.1)   -11.5
* (3.0) 
Parent born in country  14.8 
* (2.1)   -21.6
*  (2.8)  11.4 
*  (2.3)   -8.6
* (2.9) 
Living with both parents  5.2 
* (1.1)   7.4
*  (1.4)  2.6 
*  (1.0)   7.9
* (1.4) 
Parents’ education                            
  Finished primary  22.6 
* (1.7)   -14.2
*  (2.1)  12.3 
*  (1.5)   -7.3
* (1.9) 
  Secondary  31.9 
* (1.9)   -17.9
*  (2.3)  19.3 
*  (1.5)   -4.7
+ (2.0) 
  Finished university  49.0 
* (2.0)   -15.8
*  (2.6)  38.5 
*  (1.8)   -5.5
+ (2.3) 
Books at home                            
  11-25  15.5 
* (2.1)   -0.9  (2.4)  15.2 
*  (1.6)   1.9  (2.0) 
  26-100  35.6 
* (2.3)   6.8
*  (2.6)  36.1 
*  (1.7)   8.0
* (2.2) 
  101-200  49.9 
* (2.4)   4.2  (2.7)  49.0 
*  (1.8)   11.8
* (2.3) 
  More than 200  56.7 
* (2.5)   4.4  (2.8)  55.9 
*  (1.9)   13.5
* (2.4) 
Parental Interest   
               
   
Uninterested parents limit teaching  -9.9 
* (3.3)   -7.7° (4.1)  -3.1   (2.8)   -16.0
* (3.9) 
Interested parents limit teaching  -17.7 
* (5.1)   17.8
*  (5.9)  -9.8 
+  (4.1)   17.0
* (5.2) 
Grade Level   
     
     
     
   
Upper grade  25.5 
*  (0.2)   17.5
*  (0.2)  37.0 
*  (0.1)   12.2
*  (0.2) 
Students (observations)  447,089              447,089                
Schools (PSUs)  12,175           12,175           
Countries 77            77               
R
2 0.296            0.266           
Dependent variable: TIMSS international math/science test score (pooled TIMSS-95 and TIMSS-Repeat). – Coefficient: 
Coefficient estimate on the dummy (representing the effect in school systems without external exit exams). – Interaction: 
Coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the dummy and external exit exams (representing the difference in the 
effect between school systems without and with external exit exams). – Clustering-robust standard error in parentheses, using 
schools as level of clustering. – WLS regressions using students’ sampling probabilities as weights. – Controls [number of 
variables]: Central exams [1], background [8], resources [13], institutions [14], institutional interactions [14], centralisation 
[2]. – Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
* 1 percent. – 
+ 5 percent. 
Source: Based on Wößmann (2002).   
Table 2: Interaction Effects between Central Exams and Family Background in PISA 
   Math  Science  Reading 
 Coefficient  Interaction  Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient Interaction 
Born in country                                     
  Student  2.6  (3.4)  2.5  (4.4)  7.9
* (2.8)  -1.8  (4.6)  11.4
* (2.5)  -5.3  (3.8) 
  Mother  5.6
+ (2.6)  -1.0  (3.5)  11.4
* (2.3)  -7.9
+ (3.6)  9.3
* (2.0)  -3.7  (3.0) 
  Father  7.9
* (2.7)  -5.8  (3.6)  8.9
* (2.2)  3.5  (3.5)  5.9
* (2.0)  1.3  (2.9) 
Living with                                     
  Single father  15.9
* (5.3)  1.8  (7.3)  11.4
+ (5.0)  15.3
+ (7.3)  14.2
* (3.9)  2.6  (5. 9) 
  Single mother  6.7  (6.5)  -1.5  (8.8)  8.0  (6.4)  9.7  (9.1)  5.6  (4.9)  2.7  (7.1) 
  Both parents  13.0
+ (5.4)  -0.6  (7.5)  11.1
+ (5.1)  12.5° (7.5)  13.9
* (4.0)  -0.1  (6.0) 
Parents’ education                                     
  Primary  5.0  (4.5)  17.5
+ (8.5)  10.2
+ (4.7)  6.4  (9.8)  13.1
* (3.3)  20.4
* (6.8) 
  Lower secondary  8.9° (4.8)  15.2° (8.6)  11.4
+ (4.6)  6.4  (9.5)  16.5
* (3.4)  14.4
+ (7.0) 
  Upper secondary 1  21.1
* (5.0)  1.3  (8.9)  19.9
* (4.9)  2.0  (9.9)  27.3
* (3.8)  6.6  (7.2) 
  Upper secondary 2  17.3
* (4.7)  13.9  (8.7)  17.2
* (4.8)  12.4  (9.8)  25.7
* (3.7)  15.6
+ (7.0) 
  University  21.6
* (4.8)  14.3  (8.8)  21.8
* (4.8)  15.9  (9.8)  28.2
* (3.6)  19.2
* (7.1) 
Parents’ work status                                     
  At least one half-time  -3.7  (3.1)  5.3  (4.3)  -3.8  (3.0)  1.4  (4.3)  -6.7
* (2.2)  6.9
+ (3.2) 
  At least one full-time  14.8
* (2.5)  -1.0  (3.3)  10.7
* (2.4)  -1.1  (3.3)  8.2
* (1.8)  2.8  (2.5) 
  Both full-time  11.8
* (2.6)  3.2  (3.4)  8.9
* (2.6)  3.0  (3.5)  6.3
* (1.9)  6.5
+ (2.7) 
Parents’ job                                     
  White collar  15.5
* (1.5)  0.7  (1.9)  14.5
* (1.2)  1.3  (1.8)  17.1
* (1.1)  3.4
+ (1.5) 
  Blue collar  -7.5
* (2.0)  -7.3
* (2.8)  -10.6
* (1.9)  -2.4  (2.8)  -10.1
* (1.4)  -6.6
* (2.1) 
Books at home                                     
  1-10 books  12.8
* (4.2)  1.1  (6.2)  16.4
* (4.0)  -6.8  (6.4)  21.1
* (3.1)  -2.0  (4.9) 
  11-50 books  25.3
* (4.3)  5.0  (6.2)  29.7
* (3.8)  -1.5  (6.0)  38.6
* (3.2)  0.7  (5.0) 
  51-100 books  36.2
* (4.4)  0.5  (6.4)  39.3
* (3.9)  -3.5  (6.1)  48.2
* (3.2)  -0.8  (5.0) 
  101-250 books  52.6
* (4.6)  -1.0  (6.5)  51.9
* (4.0)  -1.5  (6.2)  62.8
* (3.3)  2.0  (5.1) 
  251-500 books  65.3
* (4.7)  -4.9  (6.6)  65.2
* (4.1)  -5.6  (6.3)  76.4
* (3.4)  -2.2  (5.2) 
  More than 500 books  68.0
* (4.8)  -5.1  (6.8)  64.2
* (4.2)  -1.0  (6.4)  75.5
* (3.6)  0.5  (5.4) 
Students (observations)  96,855             96,758             174,227            
Schools  (PSUs)  6,611        6,613        6,626       
Countries  31             31             31            
R
2  0.341        0.288        0.349       
Dependent variable: PISA international math/science/reading test score. – Coefficient: Coefficient estimate on the dummy 
(representing the effect in school systems without external exit exams). – Interaction: Coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term between the dummy and external exit exams (representing the difference in the effect between school systems without 
and with external exit exams). – Clustering-robust standard error in parentheses, using schools as level of clustering. – WLS 
regressions using students’ sampling probabilities as weights. – Central exams [1], background [14], home inputs [6], 
resources [8], institutions [11], institutional interactions [11], imputation dummies [41]. – Significance levels (based on 
clustering-robust standard errors): 
* 1 percent. – 
+ 5 percent. – ° 10 percent.   15
significant difference in any of the three subjects depending on whether central exams are in 
place. Second, there is also little evidence of effect heterogeneity by immigration status. The 
only statistically significant difference is that central exams dampen the effect of the country 
of birth of the mother in science, which is in line with the TIMSS results. Third, there is not 
much evidence of effect heterogeneity by family status, where statistically significant effects 
occur only in science, with the ambiguous result that both the single-father and the both-
parents categories perform higher. Fourth, in terms of parental education, work status and 
occupation, there are no statistically significant effect differences in science. In math, the 
most notable difference is that the performance lag of children from blue-collar parents is 
larger in central-exam systems. Fifth, there are more statistically significant differences in 
reading performance with respect to parental education, work status and occupation, with a 
tendency of family-background differences to be larger in central-exam systems. This result is 
somewhat unexpected, given that the central-exam variable is the simple mean of math and 
science and thus a measure containing substantial measurement error.  
In sum, the results point to relatively little heterogeneity by family background in the 
effect of central exams on PISA performance, while the disadvantage of coming from an 
immigrant or less-educated family background on TIMSS performance seems to be reduced 
by central exams, particularly in math.  
4.2.3 Parental Interest 
It was argued in Section 2.1.2 that the positive effect of central exams may be especially 
salient when parents are strongly concerned about their children’s educational progress, but 
not as much when parents are less concerned. The TIMSS teacher background questionnaires 
contain two measures that can help to test for this differential impact. First, teachers reported 
to what extent, in their view, parents uninterested in their children’s learning and progress 
limit how the teachers teach their class. Second, teachers also reported whether their teaching 
is limited by parents interested in their children’s progress. 
The results on the differential impact of these parental-influence measures with and 
without central exams are reported alongside the family-background results in Table 1. 
Students whose teachers reported that their teaching was substantially limited by uninterested 
parents performed worse than students whose teachers reported that their teaching was not 
limited by uninterested parents. This tendency was even larger in systems with central exams. 
In systems without central exams, students whose teachers reported that their teaching was 
limited a lot by interested parents again performed worse. However, in central-exam systems,   16
students whose teachers reported that interested parents limited how they teach their class 
performed just as well in math as students whose teachers did not say so, and in science, the 
effect even turns around into a statistically significant positive one. That is, even though 
teachers judged the intrusion of interested parents as limiting their teaching, student 
performance in fact did not suffer, but rather benefited from this “limitation.” 
While the involvement of interested parents may limit student performance in systems 
without central exams because parents do not have well-founded information on which to 
base their interventions, central-exam systems seem to ensure that interested parents have the 
information necessary to intervene properly. Parents uninterested in their children’s 
educational progress do not seem to make use of this information, and their lack of interest 
hurts students’ educational performance. But it seems that the involvement of interested 
parents does not go all the way to being detrimental when central exams are in place, even 
when teachers might judge it to be so. In conclusion, the effect of central exams seems to be 
heterogeneous with respect to parental interest.  
5.  Evidence on Heterogeneity by School Characteristics 
This section provides empirical evidence on the theoretical predictions presented in Section 
2.2 about how the effect of central exams on student performance may differ between schools 
with different extents of autonomy.  
5.1  The Interaction of Central Exams and School Autonomy 
In testing the hypotheses on effect heterogeneity of central exams by school autonomy 
empirically, the interest again lies in testing effect heterogeneity along an observed 
dimension. Thus, interaction effects between central exams and the observed institutional 
features, which include measures of school autonomy, are simply added to equation (2) 
above:  
(3)  Tilsc = α Ec + (Ec Bilsc) λ + Bilsc β + Rlsc γ + (Ec Ilsc) θ + Ilsc δ + a + µc + ηs + υl + εi   . 
The estimated interaction effects show whether the effect of school autonomy in various 
decision-making areas differs between education systems with and without central exams. Or, 
put differently, they show whether the effect of central exams is heterogeneous with respect to 
the extent of school autonomy.  
Table 3 reports the results on autonomy and interaction effects in TIMSS, and Table 4 in 
PISA. The following discussion focuses on the most striking findings with respect to effect   17
heterogeneity of central exams, which are also depicted in Figure 3 for the case of math. The 
diagrams in Figure 3 show, for different decision-making areas, student performance under 
the four conditions resulting from the presence and absence of school autonomy and central 
exams: the performance of students in schools without autonomy in systems without central 
exams; with autonomy but without central exams; without autonomy but with central exams; 
and with both autonomy and central exams. In each diagram, student performance is shown 
relative to the condition with the lowest performance.12  
< Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 3 about here > 
5.2  Decisions With Opportunism and With Local Knowledge Lead 
Figures 3a and 3b show the case of whether schools are responsible for deciding on teacher 
salaries, one estimated using TIMSS data, the other using PISA data. In systems without 
central exams, school autonomy regarding teacher salaries has a negative effect on student 
performance. In systems with central exams, student performance is generally higher than in 
systems without central exams, both in cases with and without school autonomy. In addition, 
however, it is striking that the effect of school autonomy on student performance in systems 
with central exams is turned completely around. Salary autonomy of schools has positive 
effects on student performance in central-exam systems.13 That is, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the effect of central exams on student performance depending on whether 
schools have autonomy over teacher salaries, with the effect being much stronger for 
autonomous schools.  
Decisions on teacher salaries thus appear to involve both incentives for opportunistic 
behaviour and local knowledge leads (cf. Figure 1). Without central exams, the negative 
performance effect of opportunistic decisions taken by the schools dominates, as this local 
opportunistic behaviour cannot be externally observed and thus cannot be sanctioned. Hence 
school decision-makers do not feel obliged to set teacher salaries so as to contribute to 
enhancing student performance, but can use their decision-making autonomy to promote other 
interests. In contrast, central exams provide information about whether the schools perform 
well or not, so that supervisory authorities and parents can draw possible consequences from 
                                                 
12  The estimates on which these diagrams are based control for all the control variables of family background, 
resources and institutions of equation (1), but – unlike the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 – not for further 
interaction effects between central exams and family or institution variables. Otherwise, the specific effect of 
central exams would be estimated quite imprecisely and the bars for the effects in central-exam systems would 
consequently be based on imprecise estimates (Wößmann, 2002). 
13  In PISA, only the math results are statistically significant.  
Table 3: Interaction Effects between Central Exams and Institutional Settings in TIMSS 
 Math  Science 
 Coefficient    Interaction  Coefficient   Interaction 
School responsibility                             
  School budget  -6.9
+ (2.8)   7.7
+ (3.5)  -12.0 
*  (2.6)   16.1
* (3.5) 
  Purchasing supplies  7.1
+ (3.2)   -5.7  (5.0)  15.6 
*  (3.1)   -6.2  (5.4) 
  Hiring teachers  21.6
* (2.6)   -20.2
* (3.1)  0.3   (1.9)   4.6° (2.6) 
  Determining teacher salaries  -28.3
* (3.6)   50.2
* (4.1)  -8.2 
*  (2.6)   29.2
* (3.1) 
Teachers’ influence                             
  Class teacher has strong influence on                             
    Money for supplies  -24.7
* (5.1)   29.1
* (6.3)  -6.9 °  (3.6)   13.6
* (4.5) 
    Kind of supplies  3.0  (2.8)   -3.5  (3.8)  6.0 
*  (2.0)   -3.7  (2.9) 
    Subject matter  -12.3
* (2.3)   8.7
* (2.8)  -4.6 
*  (1.7)   -0.7  (2.2) 
    Textbook  11.6
* (3.1)   -11.7
* (3.6)  6.3 
*  (1.8)   -9.9
* (2.6) 
  Strong influence on curriculum                             
    Teacher individually  14.6
* (2.1)   -3.9  (2.7)  14.5 
*  (1.8)   -7.4
* (2.5) 
    Subject teachers  -5.0
+ (2.4)   2.8  (3.1)  -5.8 
*  (2.1)   8.2
* (2.8) 
    School teachers collectively  -14.7
* (2.1)   6.5
+ (2.8)  -15.3 
*  (1.9)   14.4
* (2.6) 
    Teacher unions  -8.5  (5.4)   -29.5
* (8.7)  -6.7   (5.1)   -30.0
* (9.1) 
Students (observations)  447,089             447,089               
Schools (PSUs)  12,175          12,175           
Countries 77          77              
R
2 0.296          0.266           
Dependent variable: TIMSS international math/science test score (pooled TIMSS-95 and TIMSS-Repeat). – Coefficient: 
Coefficient estimate on the dummy (representing the effect in school systems without external exit exams). – Interaction: 
Coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the dummy and external exit exams (representing the difference in the 
effect between school systems without and with external exit exams). – Clustering-robust standard error in parentheses, using 
schools as level of clustering. – WLS regressions using students’ sampling probabilities as weights. – Controls [number of 
variables]: Central exams [1], background [22], background interactions [18], resources [13], centralisation and student 
incentives [6]. – Significance levels (based on clustering-robust standard errors): 
* 1 percent. – 
+ 5 percent. – ° 10 percent. 
Source: Based on Wößmann (2002).   
Table 4: Interaction Effects between Central Exams and Institutional Settings in PISA 
   Math  Science  Reading 
 Coefficient  Interaction  Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient Interaction 
School autonomy 
   
   
   
     
   
   
  Determining course content  -6.2
+ (2.5)  19.8
* (3.9)  -4.8
+ (2.1)  14.3
* (3.9)  -8.6 
* (2.3)  19.6
* (4.0) 
  Choosing textbooks  -2.0
  (5.3)  48.3
* (10.1) 2.0
  (4.1)  58.7
* (9.2)  0.1 
  (4.9)  61.0
* (10.1)
  Formulating school budget  -4.2
  (2.8)  -5.9
  (4.1)  -5.2
+ (2.5)  -1.3
  (3.9)  -0.1 
  (2.7)  -4.9
  (4.1) 
  Deciding on budget  
    allocations within school 
5.5
  (4.7)  11.6° (6.9)  11.4
* (4.4)  5.6
  (6.5)  7.5 
  (4.6)  4.3
  (6.3) 
  Hiring teachers  16.5
* (3.4)  -12.7
+ (5.0)  2.7
  (3.1)  -5.4
  (5.0)  7.8 
+ (3.2)  -8.5° (5.1) 
  Firing teachers  -4.2
  (3.6)  4.8
  (4.7)  -5.6° (3.3)  6.6
  (4.6)  -6.7 
+ (3.3)  2.7
  (4.7) 
  Establishing teachers’  
    starting salaries 
-19.4
* (6.6)  23.3
* (8.0)  -5.1
  (5.0)  3.4
  (6.1)  -5.7 
  (5.6)  0.6
  (6.8) 
  Determining teachers’  
    salary increases 
1.6
  (6.4)  -1.9
  (7.7)  -3.6
  (4.7)  2.2
  (5. 9)  -1.0 
  (5.3)  0.7
  (6.6) 
Public vs. private operation and funding 
   
     
   
   
  Publicly managed school  -16.7
* (3.5)  1.2
  (4.9)  -12.6
* (2.7)  -0.4
  (4.0)  -16.5 
* (2.8)  5.3
  (4.1) 
  Government funding (share)  8.2° (4.9)  -0.3
  (7.6)  -1.9
  (4.0)  4.1
  (6.5)  1.1 
  (4.1)  -1.7
  (6.9) 
Regularity of testing     
   
   
     
   
   
  Standardised tests  -6.4
* (2.4)  11.7
* (3.6)  -8.5
* (2.1)  15.8
* (3.3)  -6.3 
* (2.2)  13.6
* (3.3) 
Students (observations)  96,855             96,758             174,227              
Schools  (PSUs)  6,611        6,613        6,626         
Countries  31             31             31              
R
2  0.331        0.285        0.335         
Dependent variable: PISA international math/science/reading test score. – Coefficient: Coefficient estimate on the dummy 
(representing the effect in school systems without external exit exams). – Interaction: Coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term between the dummy and external exit exams (representing the difference in the effect between school systems without 
and with external exit exams). – Clustering-robust standard error in parentheses, using schools as level of clustering. – WLS 
regressions using students’ sampling probabilities as weights. – Controls [number of variables]: Central exams [1], 
background [36], home inputs [6], resources [8], imputation dummies [41]. – Significance levels (based on clustering-robust 
standard errors): 
* 1 percent. – 
+ 5 percent. – ° 10 percent. 
Source: Fuchs and Wößmann (2004).  
  
Figure 3: Interaction Effects between Central Exams and School Autonomy
 
  (a) School autonomy over teacher salaries  (b) School autonomy over teacher salaries 
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poor school behaviour. This creates incentives for decision-makers in schools not to exploit 
their autonomy in setting teacher salaries in an opportunistic way, but to use it in order to 
effectively promote student performance. The benefits of superior local knowledge then come 
into effect, as school decision-makers ought to know better than any central authority which 
teachers deserve to be rewarded for good work. The size of the performance difference of 
students in schools with salary autonomy between systems with and without central exams is 
roughly as large as two grade-level equivalents in the TIMSS studies.  
The case is similar when decisions on school resources are decentralised in such a way that 
teachers have a say in the money available for purchasing supplies, based on data from the 
TIMSS studies which feature extensive teacher background questionnaires (Figure 3c). In this 
decision-making area too, decentralised decision-making autonomy has a negative effect on 
student performance in systems without central exams, whereas it has a positive effect in 
systems with central exams. However, the difference between schools with and without 
teacher influence on resource funding in systems with central exams is not statistically 
significant. This could be due either to the fact that opportunistic behaviour is not entirely 
prevented by central exams in this case and consequently weakens the positive effect of local 
knowledge, or to the fact that there is no significant local knowledge lead.  
A similar pattern can also be observed for school autonomy in determining course 
contents, reported in the PISA study (Figure 3d). In systems without external exit exams, 
students in schools that have autonomy in determining course contents perform statistically 
significantly worse than otherwise. That is, the effect of school autonomy in this area seems 
to be negative if there are no external exit exams to hold schools accountable for what they 
are doing. Again, the effect turns around to be statistically significantly positive if schools are 
made accountable for their behaviour through external exit exams. This pattern of results 
suggests that the decision-making area of determining course contents also entails substantial 
incentives for local opportunistic behaviour as well as significant local knowledge lead. The 
incentives for local opportunistic behaviour stem from the fact that content decisions 
influence the workload of the teachers, and they lead to the negative autonomy effect in 
systems without accountability. The local knowledge lead stems from the fact that teachers 
probably know best what specific course contents would be best suited for their specific 
students, and it leads to the positive autonomy effect in systems where external exit exams 
mitigate the scope for opportunistic behaviour.   19
5.3  Decisions With Opportunism and Without Local Knowledge Lead 
There are other dimensions of school autonomy along which the effect of central exams 
differs, albeit not as strongly as in the previous cases. Thus, in systems without central exams, 
school autonomy in budgeting has a negative impact on TIMSS performance (Table 3), which 
may be due to incentives for opportunistic behaviour in funding. In systems with central 
exams, this negative effect of school autonomy disappears, although without turning into a 
significant positive effect. This could be due to the fact that external agencies need by no 
means have a knowledge disadvantage in budget questions compared to individual schools 
which often lack the required specialist staff.  
The same argument might be raised for the task of determining the subject matter to be 
covered in class, which shows a similar pattern depending on how much autonomy teachers 
have in the task (Table 3). A similar tendency also emerges for school autonomy in decisions 
on firing teachers, reported only in PISA, in all three subjects (Table 4). The relationship 
between firing autonomy and science and reading performance is statistically significantly 
negative in systems without external exit exams, but not in systems with external exit exams. 
The same pattern also emerges depending on whether teachers of a school collectively 
have a say in the curriculum to be taught, reported only in TIMSS (Table 3). Without 
monitoring by central exams, collective teacher influence has a negative impact on student 
performance, which may be due to opportunistic interests of teachers as regards the workload 
to be fulfilled. If a central-exam system does exist, this negative performance effect is 
attenuated into an insignificant effect of teacher autonomy. This can be rationalised within the 
framework of the above model by assuming attenuated opportunistic behaviour with the 
simultaneous absence of local knowledge leads where decisions are taken collectively by the 
teachers.14  
5.4  Further Decision-Making Areas 
Things look different when individual teachers rather than the teachers’ collective can 
influence the curriculum (Table 3). In this case, a positive effect of teacher autonomy on 
student performance is observed in systems with and without central exams, showing no 
statistically significant difference between the two systems in math (and a slightly attenuated 
effect in science). In the model framework considered here, this would mean that the 
                                                 
14  Note that the underlying estimate controls for the influence of individual teachers on the curriculum, so that 
the individual knowledge benefits of the teachers are held constant.  
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individual teachers are unable to push through opportunistic behaviours in addition to their 
collective influence, but that they possess local knowledge advantages as individuals.  
In PISA, a positive relationship between school autonomy in deciding on budget 
allocations within schools (within the framework of a formulated overall school budget) tends 
to be stronger in systems with external exit exams (Table 4). The difference between the two 
kinds of systems is statistically significant only in math, though. The pattern suggests that this 
decision-making area features only small incentives for local opportunistic behaviour, but a 
significant local knowledge lead.  
In systems without external exit exams, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between school autonomy in choosing textbooks and student achievement in either subject on 
the PISA test (Table 4). However, there is a substantial statistically significant positive 
relationship in systems with external exit exams. This pattern reflects the theoretical case 
where incentives for local opportunistic behaviour are offset by a local knowledge lead. 
External exit exams suppress the negative opportunism effect and keep the positive 
knowledge-lead effect. Thus, the beneficial effects of school autonomy in textbook choice 
prevail only in systems where schools are made accountable for their behaviour through 
external exit exams.15 
No statistically significant relationship is detected between school autonomy in hiring 
teachers and student performance in science in PISA, and in science in TIMSS, the 
relationship turns slightly positive in central-exam systems. In math and reading, however, the 
relationship between hiring autonomy and student performance is statistically significantly 
positive in systems without external exit exams, but not in systems with external exit exams. 
It seems hard to rationalise this result in the framework of the theoretical model. It may be 
that the pattern reflects a positive selection effect of teacher choice on the detriment of non-
autonomous schools in systems without external exit exams, which might be less pronounced 
in the more transparent external-exam systems. 
PISA also provides school-level data on the public versus private management and funding 
of schools (cf. Fuchs and Wößmann, 2004, for details). The results are found to be 
independent of whether the school system has external exit exams are not (Table 4). In both 
                                                 
15  TIMSS reports whether teachers have a lot of influence on textbooks, and the results are quite different 
(Table 3). If individual teachers in systems without central exams have a say in the textbooks used, this has a 
positive effect on student performance. This is likely to be due to local knowledge leads which are not 
counteracted by opportunistic interests, as the teachers would do themselves a disservice if they were to select 
unsuitable books. This positive effect of teacher autonomy is smaller and statistically insignificant in systems 
with central exams (cf. Wößmann, 2003c).   21
kinds of systems, students perform statistically significantly better in privately managed 
schools. Also in both kinds of systems, science and reading performance does not vary with 
schools’ share of public funding, while math performance increases with public funding.  
The general pattern of results strongly suggests that there is effect heterogeneity of central 
exams with respect to school characteristics, particularly in terms of the autonomy of schools 
and teachers. External exit exams and school autonomy are complementary institutional 
features of a school system in any decision-making area that includes scope for opportunism 
and local knowledge leads. School autonomy tends to be more beneficial for student 
performance in all subjects when external exit exams are in place to hold the autonomous 
schools accountable for their decision-making. This evidence corroborates the reasoning of 
external exams as the “currencies” of school systems (Wößmann, 2003c) which ensure that 
otherwise decentralised systems function in the interest of students’ educational performance.  
6.  Evidence on Heterogeneity by Time 
This section presents empirical evidence on how the effect of central exams on student 
performance differs along the time dimension (cf. Section 2.3 for the theoretical background). 
First, it looks at whether the effect of central exit exams at the end of secondary schools 
increases during secondary school. Second, it estimates whether regular standardised testing 
throughout secondary school exerts effects in addition to the effect of central exit exams.  
6.1  The Effect of Central Exit Exams by Grade 
The first theoretical prediction of effect heterogeneity over time was that the effect of central 
exit exams may increase with grade levels. This effect heterogeneity of central exit exams can 
be tested using the TIMSS-95 data, which allows a comparison between seventh- and eighth-
grade performance.  
The results on the interaction effect between central exams and grade level are included 
alongside the family-background results in Table 1. The impact of central exams on TIMSS 
math performance is 17.5 percent of a standard deviation larger in eighth grade than in 
seventh grade. Likewise, the impact of central exams on eighth-grade science performance is 
12.2 percent of a standard deviation larger than their impact in seventh grade. Thus, the 
impact that central exit exams exert on student performance grows over the course of 
secondary education, showing effect heterogeneity over time.   22
6.2  The Effect of Regular Standardised Testing 
The second theoretical prediction of effect heterogeneity over time was that regular 
standardised testing during the course of schooling may have positive effects that add to the 
effects of central school-leaving exams. The PISA study provides school-level information on 
whether standardised testing was used for fifteen-year-old students at least once a year, which 
allows for a test of this hypothesis.  
As the results reported in Table 4 show, the relationship between standardised tests and 
student achievement differs strongly and statistically significantly between systems with and 
without external exit exams. If there are no external exit exams, standardised testing is 
statistically significantly negatively related to student achievement in all three subjects. One 
way to explain this finding would be that if the educational goals and standards of the school 
system are not clearly specified, standardised testing can backfire and lead to weaker student 
performance. But the relationship between standardised testing and student achievement in all 
three subjects turns around to be statistically significantly positive in systems where external 
exit exams are in place.  
Figure 4 depicts this complementary relationship between central exit exams and earlier 
standardised testing,16 which shows a pattern similar to the effect heterogeneity with respect 
to school autonomy in decisions that involve both opportunism and local knowledge leads (cf. 
Section 5.2). That is, regular standardised examination seems to have additional positive 
performance effects when added to central exit exams. Thus, there is an additional effect 
heterogeneity of standardised exams along the time dimension, in that the effect of central 
exit exams at the end of secondary schooling can be supplemented by earlier standardised 
testing.  
< Figure 4 about here > 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
The paper has analysed the heterogeneity of the effect of central exams on student 
performance along three dimensions, presenting evidence from three international student 
achievement tests (TIMSS, TIMSS-Repeat and PISA). First, the paper has looked at 
differences in the central-exam effect by student characteristics. It was argued that due to the 
lower labour-market mobility of less-skilled workers and a reasonable capability of local 
                                                 
16  As in Figure 3, the regression on which Figure 4 is based controls for family, resource and institutional 
controls, but not for interaction terms between central exams and other variables.  
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employers to assess local grades, the effect of central exams on student performance may be 
lower for low-ability students relative to high-ability students. Quantile-regression estimates 
support this pattern for most of the international tests. By including interaction effects 
between family-background measures and central exams, it could be shown that the effect of 
central exams does not vary substantially along most family-background dimensions. The 
main heterogeneity is that in TIMSS, the disadvantage of coming from an immigrant or less-
educated family background seems to be reduced by central exams. More evidently, parental 
involvement gets better informed in central-exam systems, so that the interest that parents 
bring to the teaching of their children is more beneficial when central exams are in place.  
Second, the paper has looked at heterogeneity in the effect of central exams by school and 
teacher autonomy. In a principal-agent framework of educational production, it could be 
shown that the effect of central exams depends on the extent of school autonomy, particularly 
in decision-making areas that contain incentives for opportunistic behaviour. In such areas, 
central exams can avert the disadvantages of opportunistic behaviour by introducing 
accountability, bringing the advantages of local knowledge to the fore. The evidence shows 
that there is indeed substantial heterogeneity in the effect of central exams depending on 
whether schools have autonomy. The effect of central exams is much stronger for schools that 
have autonomy in such decision-making areas as establishing teacher salaries, determining 
course contents, budgeting, choosing textbooks, determining the subject matter to be covered 
in class and for schools whose class teachers can influence resource funding. Thus, there is a 
complementarity between central exams and school autonomy.  
Third, the paper has analysed whether the effect of external testing may vary over the 
course of secondary education. It was found that the effect of central exit exams at the end of 
secondary schools on how much students learn during secondary school increases from 
seventh to eighth grade. Also, regular standardised examinations during secondary education 
exert additional positive performance effects when added to central exit exams.  
In sum, there is clear evidence that the performance effects of central exams are 
heterogeneous, differing along the student, school and time dimensions. The evidence not 
only shows who gains most from central exams, but also that central exit exams are 
particularly performance-conducive once combined with school autonomy and regular 
external testing.    24
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